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SHOULD ‘PUBLIC REASON’ DEVELOPED UNDER US 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE APPLY TO 
AUSTRALIA? 
KEITH THOMPSON* 
Abstract 
 
John Rawls’ idea of public reason holds that comprehensive doctrines including religion should not be 
allowed a voice in the public square.  Such ideas prevent society achieving that ‘overlapping consensus’ 
which is said to be a requirement for enduring peace and progress.  However, the suggestion that some 
ideas should be excluded from public debate is anti-democratic.  This article reviews Rawls’ idea of 
public reason’ against its US legal context and suggests it was a response to US Supreme Court decisions 
concerning their First Amendment.  Though our framers copied most of that clause into the Australian 
Constitution, the High Court has interpreted it completely differently.  The article concludes that Rawls’ 
idea of public reason does not fit in a Westminster democracy tied to parliamentary sovereignty rather 
than judicial review. 
 
I     INTRODUCTION 
 
My proposition in this article is that the idea of ‘public reason’, most famously articulated by 
John Rawls, is an American idea that does not wisely transfer to jurisdictions where the 
establishment clause jurisprudence of the United States’ (‘US’) Supreme Court does not apply.  
This article develops previous research which shows that the freedom to manifest or exercise 
one’s religious beliefs (including religious speech) does not require that the state be completely 
excluded from involvement in religion, as is the thrust of the US jurisprudence.1  Even countries 
that respect and have been informed by the US prohibition on the establishment of religion by 
the state,2 have not considered that the prohibition requires the exclusion of all religious 
involvement in the public square or that an impermeable wall of separation must be erected 
between church and state to prevent any reception of the ideas of one by the other.  The 
rejection of the American ‘complete separation’ idea is most obvious in European countries 
with established churches which have implemented a version of free exercise that is consistent 
with the European Convention on Human Rights and other international human rights 
instruments.  Australian jurisprudence also suggests that the prohibition of religious 
establishment in the US Bill of Rights need not prevent natural and respectful religious exercise 
and expression in the public square.  
 
                                                     
* Associate Professor and Associate Dean, University of Notre Dame Australia (Sydney campus).  Many people 
have helped me develop this paper.  I am sure I will not remember them all, but among others I thank Rex Ahdar, 
Nicholas Aroney, Iain Benson, Steve Chavura, Joel Harrison, Gabriel Moens, Patrick Parkinson, Hayden Ramsey 
and Michael Stokes.  They have helped me hone my thinking, detected glaring omissions and inconsistencies, and 
clarified my thinking when I had not perfectly expressed what I felt.  But as always, the errors that remain are my 
own. 
1 See for eg, Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, ‘Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?’ (2004) 49 McGill 
Law Review 635. 
2 Cole Durham and Brett Scharffs observe that ‘the US approach [to establishment] is not as unusual as some 
believe, since a number of countries, such as Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, have constitutional provisions 
that closely resemble the Establishment Clause of the US Constitution’.  However, they observe (as will be 
discussed below in relation to Australia) that ‘these [provisions] are often interpreted in quite different ways’: W 
Cole Durham, Jr and Brett G Scharffs, Law and Religion, National, International, and Comparative Perspectives 
(Aspen Publishers, 2010) 370. 
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The reason for writing such an article in Australia is that there is an increasing demand from 
the secular left that religious worship and expression be confined to private space and that 
religious reasons for political decisions should be affirmatively excluded from debate in the 
public square.  That suggestion was most strongly put by Anna Crabb as she asserted that 
during John Howard’s term as Prime Minister ‘the framing of the September 11 terrorist attacks 
and the subsequent “war on terror” as a religious conflict’ had ‘weakened adherence to Rawls’ 
… liberal consensus’ that religious beliefs should be excluded from the public forum.3  But Ms 
Crabb is not alone. Amanda Lohrey has written that Australia became less fair during John 
Howard’s term as Prime Minister in part, because ‘churches ha[d] been markedly successful 
… in lobbying for an economic agenda that is straightforwardly about maximizing government 
funding of the churches’ own infrastructure’.4  Less scholarly contemporary examples of the 
thinly veiled idea that religious ideas have no place in the public square include Tim Dick’s 
Sydney Morning Herald assertion that religious freedom is “bigotry disguised as belief”,5 
parroting a New York Times editorial on March 31, 20156 and a writer in the same newspaper 
two weeks later opining that institutional religion is a sanctuary for homophobes who should 
not be allowed to preach against homosexual practices.7 
 
I set out my proposition in two parts. In relation to the first part of my writing (set out under 
Part II below) I outline and discuss the development and current nature of US establishment 
clause jurisprudence.  My intention is not to criticise North American jurisprudence, but rather 
to show that there are other versions of religious freedom which do not relegate religious 
expression and exercise to private space.  As the Australian establishment clause is almost 
identical to the US establishment clause, l show that the form the words taken is not the 
problem.  In relation to the second part of my writing (set out under Part III below) I explain 
how John Rawls’ idea of public reason is a product of the US establishment clause 
jurisprudence’s concern to separate church and state.  I identify how the meaning of the US 
establishment clause has been developed in US Supreme Court cases.  My reason for 
identifying that developing meaning is to show that what John Rawls wrote and when he wrote 
it was coloured by the changing US Supreme Court’s religious freedom orthodoxy.  Like the 
US Supreme Court, Rawls maintained that ‘liberty of conscience’ was sacred, even though he 
ultimately concluded that the expression of religious ideas should be ‘voluntarily’ confined to 
private places.  I conclude that John Rawls’ idea of public reason is flawed because it accepts 
as gospel, the US jurisprudential idea that true freedom of religion requires a version of state 
neutrality that excludes all religious expression from the public square.  The exclusion of 
religious expression from the public square in US jurisprudence is dangerous because it 
suppresses religious freedom.  The idea of Public Reason is dangerous because it sends a 
message that it is alright to suppress religious expression for reasons other than the risk of 
significant harm in society.  Current US religious freedom jurisprudence is inconsistent with 
the religious freedom that is set out in international human rights instruments which better 
respects religious diversity and expression.  The contemporary US version of religious freedom 
as limited by Rawls’ doctrine of public reason is not acceptable in common law jurisdictions 
which hold that the legislature rather than the judges is sovereign.  Nor is public reason 
convincing in civil law jurisdictions where the existence of an established church remains 
compatible with religious expression and manifestation in the public square.  When the US 
                                                     
3 Anna Crabb, ‘Invoking Religion in Australian Politics’ (2009) 44(2) Australian Journal of Political Science 259, 
260-61. 
4 Amanda Lohrey, ‘Voting for Jesus: Christianity and Politics in Australia’, Quarterly Essay 22 (2006) 60, 63. 
5 “Comment”, Sydney Morning Herald, May 26, 2015. 
6 “Religion as a cover for bigotry”, in Editorials/Letters, The New York Times, A22. 
7 “Same-sex sinners”, Bruni F, The New York Times Sunday Review, April 5, 2015, 3. 
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establishment clause ideology is extracted from Rawls’ idea of public reason, public reason 
can be identified as an anti-democratic Trojan horse with the potential to neuter the views of 
up to 4/5th of the world’s population in favour of a non-believing elite.  As the anti-democratic 
nature of Rawls’ idea of public reason is exposed, its respectability and convincing power 
should fade. 
 
II    US ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE  
 
The First Amendment to the US Constitution states: 
 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances. 
 
The first two clauses deal what is now called freedom of religion.  The first of those clauses is 
known as the establishment clause and the second as the free exercise clause. Both clauses have 
been the subject of considerable litigation since they were adopted in December 1791.  Because 
both clauses limit US federal government action, most of that litigation has been brought by 
private individuals claiming that federal government legislation has unlawfully established 
religion or interfered with religious practice.  After the Fourteenth Amendment was passed in 
1868 following the Civil War, succeeding panels of the US Supreme Court have confirmed 
that the restrictions imposed by the First Amendment on government legislation applied also 
to the US state governments.8 
 
There are many US cases about the establishment clause.  Though I acknowledge the extensive 
debate about that Clause in the Bill of Rights that has been fought using the ‘original intent’ of 
the framers as a weapon, I will not engage in that debate.  My purpose below is to identify what 
the US Supreme Court has said concerning what the establishment clause means in the past 
and in the present. 
 
The first case that directly engaged the US establishment clause concerned whether federal 
funding to build an isolating ward or building at the Providence hospital in Rhode Island, 
breached the Constitution.9  The Supreme Court observed that though the hospital was operated 
by the Catholic Church, it had been established by an Act of Congress and Congress retained 
authority to direct its staff regardless of their religious commitments.  Two-thirds of the 
capacity of the proposed new building was reserved for the use of poor persons sent by the 
District and those patients would choose their own physicians and nurses at the cost of the 
District.  As the hospital had a secular purpose, it did not conflict with the First Amendment. 
 
Before the Civil War, it had been clear that the clauses of the First Amendment did not bind 
the states.  They prohibited the US federal government from establishing religion or passing 
laws that interfered with citizens’ free exercise, but did not stop the states establishing churches 
or proscribing free exercise.  But the Fourteenth Amendment passed after the Civil War in 
1868, extended the reach of the Bill of Rights into the states though the extent of that reach was 
not defined in respect of the religion clauses in the First Amendment until the decisions reached 
                                                     
8 In Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296 (1940), the US Supreme Court held that by virtue of the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the US states were also bound by the free exercise clause.  In Everson v 
Board of Education, 330 US 1 (1947), the Court similarly found that the establishment clause also applied to the 
states. 
9 Bradfield v Roberts, 175 US 291 (1899). 
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in 194010 and 1947.11  In 1940, the Supreme Court found that the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protected free exercise as a ‘quintessential individual right’.12  But the 
establishment clause did not directly engage individual rights and had originally been drafted 
only to prevent the federal government from interfering with the state religious establishments 
that existed when the federal Bill of Rights was passed in 1789. 
 
But in Everson v Board of Education in 1947 that limited view of the scope of the establishment 
clause was fundamentally changed.  Though the Supreme Court upheld the New Jersey statute 
which funded student transportation to all schools whether they were religious or not, when he 
wrote the 5-4 majority judgment, Justice Hugo Black famously changed the establishment 
clause landscape by insisting that the establishment clause required the separation of church 
and state, invoking President Thomas Jefferson in aid of the proposition: 
 
The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the 
federal government can set up a church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, 
or prefer one religion over another.  Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away 
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.  No person can 
be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance.  No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.  
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any 
religious organizations or groups and vice versa.  In the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and State’.13 
 
The debate concerning the meaning and authority of Jefferson’s words has raged ever since.  
Critics have shown that Madison rather than Jefferson was the most prominent author of the 
final version of the First Amendment.14  But it is clear that in other writings, Madison 
acknowledged at least, the need to separate the ecclesiastical and civil spheres to prevent their 
mutually corrupting influence.15  The separation argument has antecedents dating back at least 
to the ‘two swords’ theory that Pope Gregory VII used in 12th century Europe to ‘settle’ the 
investiture controversy.16  Whatever the rights or wrongs of the ‘separation is necessary’ 
argument, Justice Black’s words struck a chord that has continued to resonate in US 
jurisprudence.  Arguably, Justice Black’s generous interpretation of the meaning of the 
                                                     
10 Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296 (1940). 
11 Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1 (1947). 
12 Michael W McConnell, John H Garvey and Thomas C Berg, Religion and the Constitution (Aspen Law and 
Business, 2002) 88. 
13 Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1, 15-16 (1947). 
14 For example, when former US Chief Justice William H Rehnquist was first an Associate Justice, he delivered 
a dissenting opinion in Wallace v Jaffree 472 US 38, 91 (1985) where he rewrote the Everson interpretation of 
the establishment clause written 38 years previously. He began his criticism with the statement that ‘[i]t is 
impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but 
unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been expressly  freighted with Jefferson’s misleading metaphor [‘a 
wall of separation between church and state’] for nearly forty years’: at 92.  
15 Koppelman has detailed Madison’s concern that religion should not be promoted simply because it conduces to 
good citizenship and that ‘to employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy’ was ‘an unhallowed perversion of the 
means of salvation’: Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, Northwestern 
University School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory No 08-32, 4, 25-26, 66 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1268406>. 
16 Berman says the terms ‘Investiture Struggle’ to describe the contests between the Church and States in the 11th 
and 12th centuries is something of an understatement.  The transformation involved was much more revolutionary 
than that term implies and sought the complete ‘disengagement of the sacred and profane spheres’: Harold J 
Berman, Law and Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1983) 87-88.  Brian Tierney dates the idea of the ‘two 
swords’ to Bernard of Clairvaux in the middle of the 12th century: Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State 
1050-1300 (Prentice-Hall, 1964) 87-88. 
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establishment clause in 1947 was the watershed from which the constitutional invalidity of 
public school prayer began to flow in 1962.  That jurisprudence is note-worthy.  Since 1962,17 
public school prayer and anything similar18 or substituted for it19 has been unconstitutional. 
And although the jurisprudence surrounding official sponsorship of Christmas nativity20 and 
other public displays is more equivocal,21 it was a public display case that led to Justice 
O’Connor’s ruling that any government endorsement of a practice or event which led a 
participant to feel a sense of otherness or exclusion, would offend the establishment clause 
prohibition.22 
 
In 1971, Justice Black’s interpretation of the establishment clause morphed into the ‘excessive 
entanglement’ test that came out of the decision in Lemon v Kurtman.23  The idea that secular 
government laws which were ‘excessively entangled’ in religion were constitutionally invalid, 
and the related ideas that no law was valid which had neither a secular purpose nor a primary 
secular effect, have become the touchstones to which most US judges refer when deciding what 
the establishment clause means.  
 
Attempts to moderate the rigour of those judicial tests have not been completely unsuccessful.  
Justice O’Connor’s compromise idea in Lynch v Donnelly24 that it was state endorsement of 
religion that made non-religious believers feel like outsiders that constitutionally invalidated 
state laws, has appealed to some judges because it is not as unyielding as the idea that any 
religious idea in a law should invalidate it.  But the suggestion that a scintilla of state 
endorsement of a religious idea in any law should invalidate it, still operates as a veto in the 
hands of a judge trained to believe that the establishment clause requires absolute separation of 
church and state.  The competing judgments handed down on June 27, 200525 suggest the 
Supreme Court Justices do not want the establishment clause to work as a black and white veto 
on the constitutionality of a law that has even the whiff of anything religious about it.  But the 
argument that only a public display that has more than fifty years standing will survive judicial 
review said by some commentators to explain the difference in these two 2005 decisions,26 is 
                                                     
17 Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962). 
18 For example, the mandatory reading of the Lord’s Prayer was struck down in Abington School District v 
Schempp, 374 US 203 (1963). 
19 In Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38 (1985), the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama law enabling a daily period 
of silence in schools which students could use for private prayers. 
20 A nativity display or crèche was held not to breach the establishment clause in Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668 
(1984), but a similar display breached the establishment prohibition in the clause in Allegheny County v Greater 
Pittsburgh, ACLU 492 US 573 (1989). 
21 Two Ten Commandments cases decided by the Supreme Court on the same day were similarly decided 
differently in 2005.  In Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677 (2005), the display at the Texas state capitol was upheld 
because it had a secular purpose.  But in McCreary County v ACLU or Kentucky, 545 US 844 (2005), displays in 
several Kentucky county courthouses were unconstitutional because they were not integrated into an overall 
secular purpose. 
22 Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984). 
23 403 US 602 (1971). 
24 465 US 668 (1984). 
25 Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677 (2005) and McCreary County v ACLU or Kentucky, 545 US 844 (2005).  For 
a brief summary of their findings, see above n 15. 
26 Some have suggested that the two decisions may be reconciled by the Supreme Court’s earlier finding in Marsh 
v Chambers, 463 US 783, 786 (1983) that some government practices are permissible ‘because they are deeply 
imbedded in the history and tradition of this country’.  See for eg, John Witte Jr and Joel A Nichols, Religion and 
the American Constitutional Experiment (Westview Press, 3rd ed, 2011) 229-31.  See also Matthew J Morrison, 
‘The Van Orden and McCreary County Cases: Closing the Gaps Remaining between the Established Lines of Ten 
Commandments Jurisprudence’, (2007) 13 Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice 435, 
noting the ‘history and tradition’ reconciliation of the two decisions but suggesting that Justice Kennedy’s 
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not philosophically satisfying.  Nor is the logic of those two decisions consistent with 
international free exercise norms though they may explain why some overtly religious practices 
and symbols have thus far survived judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment.27 
 
What is most unsatisfying about the current state of US First Amendment jurisprudence is that 
it seems internally inconsistent to those familiar with freedom of religion under international 
human rights instruments.  That is because the establishment clause jurisprudence seems to 
compete with the idea of free exercise expressed in the immediately following sister clause.  
The free exercise clause is also expressed as a prohibition – ‘Congress … shall make no law 
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]’ – so that US legislatures are not obliged to protect 
freedom of religion in the manner set out in modern international human rights instruments.  
The US free exercise clause only prevents US legislatures passing laws which would interfere 
with the free exercise of religion.  But if the interpretation of the two religion clauses was even-
handed, one would expect indirect legislative interference with free exercise to be as proscribed 
as indirect legislative establishment.  That is, just as legislation that indirectly endorses a 
religious practice or idea is routinely struck down, one would expect even-handed judges to 
strike down a law that indirectly interferes with some manifestation of religion that does not 
hurt anyone. But that is not the way the US jurisprudence works.  It is not that American 
lawyers have missed this inconsistency.  It took centre stage in Walz v Tax Commission in 
197028 when the Court decided 7:1 that religious tax exemptions did not breach the 
establishment clause.  Chief Justice Burger wrote that ‘absolutely straight line … rigidity could 
defeat the basic purpose’29 of the two religion clauses.  The general principle that he ‘deduc[ed] 
from the First Amendment’30 was that the Court would ‘not tolerate either governmentally 
established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of th[e]se expressly 
proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent 
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without 
interference.’31 
 
That Chief Justice Burger’s ‘play in the joints’ metaphor identified that the two religion clauses 
are ‘frequently in tension’32 and need to be balanced, is manifest in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
more recent understanding that ‘room for play in the joints between [the clauses meant that] … 
there are some state actions permitted by the establishment clause but not required by the free 
exercise clause’.33  But this formulation of the tension also manifests that free exercise 
considerations are likely to come off second best in such a balancing exercise since the Court 
has not developed inviolable Lemon tests to determine Free Exercise constitutional validity.  If 
either Chief Justice Burger or Chief Justice Rehnquist had seen the two religion clauses as in 
any way equal in this balance, then government interference in religious practice that was 
                                                     
‘coercion test’ expounded in Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577 (1992) is a more philosophically satisfying way to 
reconcile the two decisions.  But others have suggested these transparently divergent decisions manifest a rupture 
in the uneasy détente between the conservative and liberal blocks in the Supreme Court which had been respected 
for many years (for eg, Laura S Underkuffler, ‘Through a Glass Darkly: Van Orden, McCreary, and the Dangers 
of Transparency in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence’, (2006) 5 First Amendment Law Review 5. 
27 The US Pledge of Allegiance has survived so far despite the decision in Elk Grove Unified School District v 
Newdow, 542 US 1 (2004).   The religious inscriptions chiseled into Supreme Court stone, the religious prayers 
which open legislative sittings in many US jurisdictions, and the ‘In God we trust’ words on US currency are also 
alive and well as at this writing. 
28 397 US 664 (1970). 
29 Ibid 669. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Locke v Davey, 540 US 712, 718-719 (2004). 
33 Ibid. 
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privately motivated would have been a larger constitutional problem.  And it certainly was not 
a problem when student initiated prayer was struck down under the establishment clause in 
Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe.34  Absent such equality between the clauses, the 
benevolent neutrality to which Chief Justice Burger said the Court aspires, presents as an 
illusory tease.35  
 
A     The Establishment of Religion Does Not Offend  
International Religious Freedom Norms 
 
The first point to be made in this discussion is that the US idea that the establishment of religion 
is inconsistent with human rights norms, does not appear in any international human rights 
instrument.36  Indeed, as John Witte Jr has observed, ‘[i]nternational law and many domestic 
laws regard the material and moral cooperation of church and state as conducive, and 
sometimes essential, to the achievement of religious liberty’.37  Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh 
develop John Witte’s insight further by observing that ‘[i]nternational treaties and covenants 
are worded in free exercise terms only’38 and that ‘the more radical demands for separationism 
reified in the American “wall of separation” metaphor’39 are ‘conspicuous[ly] absent’40 from 
international norms. They continue that the classic Krishnaswami Report ‘concluded that it was 
impossible to recommend a particular form of judicial relationship between the state and 
religion’.41  
 
Durham and Scharffs have similarly concluded that there is no one correct or safe structural 
model that provides optimum religious freedom in any society.42  There are many countries 
with established churches that do very well in supporting the religious freedom of all their 
subjects even when there is an established state church.43  For Ahdar and Leigh, ‘neither 
establishment of religion, nor formal separation of state and religion, would in themselves 
constitute religious intolerance or discrimination’44 under either the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1996 (‘ICCPR’) or the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All 
                                                     
34 530 US 290 (2000). 
35 In Canada, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé of that country’s Supreme Court has warned that leaving questions about 
the bounds of freedom of religious practice to judicial discretion and case-by-case analysis – ‘balancing’ in the 
US First Amendment jurisprudence above - has a ‘chilling effect’ on religious freedom generally.  She said that 
religion and spirituality prosper best when the legal rules are certain and predictable: R v Gruenke (1991) 3 SCR 
263, 
36 Ahdar and Leigh, above n 1, 658. 
37 John Witte Jr, ‘Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional Experiment’ (1996) 
71 Notre Dame Law Review 371, 440. 
38 Ahdar and Leigh, above n 1, 657. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid.  Ahdar and Leigh attribute this description of Krishnaswami Report to Brice Dickson (‘The United Nations 
and Freedom of Religion’ (1995) 44 International Comparative Law Quarterly 327, 344).  These opinions of the 
Krishnaswami Report are shared by Bahiyyih G Tahzib in her book, Freedom of Religion or Belief: Ensuring 
Effective International Legal Protection (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996) 131-32, where she cites various 
commentators who have described the Report as ‘careful and comprehensive’ and a ‘landmark’ in the United 
Nations’ ‘efforts … to eradicate prejudice and discrimination based on religion or belief”. 
42 Durham and Scharffs, above n 2, 112-62. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ahdar and Leigh, above n 1, 659 citing Donna J Sullivan, ‘Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief through 
the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination’ (1988) 82 American Journal 
of International Law 487, 490.  See also, Ahdar and Leigh, above n 1, 658-59. 
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Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (‘Elimination of 
Religious Intolerance Declaration’).45  
 
The bottom line is that the US First Amendment prohibition on the federal establishment of 
religion was required in 1789 to protect the US Bill of Rights from a veto by the six US states 
that then did have established churches.  This clause in the First Amendment was intended to 
protect American pluralism perhaps on the basis of Voltaire’s popular insight that:  
 
If there were only one religion in England there would be danger of despotism, if there were two, they 
would cut each other's throats, but there are thirty, and they live in peace and happiness.46 
 
Certainly the 21st century US understanding of the First Amendment is different, but 
international practice and American history confirm that the separation of church and state are 
not essential to the satisfactory settlement of religious freedom in any society.  Australian 
experience makes this insight even more clear since the Australian framers copied the 
American religion clauses almost word for word into their 1901 Constitution.47   
 
Section 116 of the Australian Constitution reads: 
 
The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious 
observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as 
a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.  
 
Even though the two clauses are very similar, the High Court of Australia has found that the 
replacement of the US word ‘respecting’ with the word ‘for’ by the Australian framers, means 
that the Australian clause is significantly narrower than its American template.  The facts in 
Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Black v Commonwealth (‘DOGS case’)48  which elicited this 
stark difference in approach concerned school funding in the State of Victoria.  In a relator 
action, the applicants argued that the federal government’s funding of religious schools was a 
breach of the establishment clause of the Australian Constitution quoted above using logic 
lifted straight out of the US cases.49  They lost 6:1 with only Murphy J accepting that the US 
jurisprudence should be followed.50  The majority did not accept Murphy J’s proposition that 
the different interpretation of the changed wording in the Australian Constitution was ‘hair-
                                                     
45 ICCPR, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976); 
Elimination of Religious Intolerance Declaration, GA Res 36/55, 36 UN GAOR Supp (No 51), 36th sess, 73rd 
plen mtg, arts 1–8, UN Doc A/36/684 (1981).  See also Universal Declaration on Human Rights (‘UDHR’), GA 
Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948).    
46 Voltaire, 6th Philosophical Letter, 1734. 
47 Durham and Scharffs, above n 2, 370 where they note that Japan and the Philippines have also followed US 
establishment clause ideology for their constitutions. 
48 (1981) 146 CLR 559.  Note however, that the Australian approach is very close to that which Associate Justice 
Rehnquist wished to take in his dissenting judgment in Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38, 91 (1985). 
49 DOGS case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 578. 
50 Murphy J was emphatic - ‘The United States’ decision on the establishment clause should be followed.  The 
arguments for departing from them (based on trifles of differences in wording between the United States and 
Australian establishment clauses) are hair-splitting, and not consistent with the broad general approach which 
should be taken to constitutional guarantees of freedom’: ibid 632).  But his brethren steadfastly rejected his 
argument that the Australian jurisprudence should be followed by what the US Supreme Court had already 
decided.  Barwick CJ said simply that the Australian constitutional language was always controlling: ibid 578. 
Wilson J was stronger, citing Gibbs J (in the earlier case of Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v The 
Commonwealth of Australia (1980) 28 ALR 257, 270) where he had said that ‘although we regard the decisions 
of the Supreme Court with the greatest respect, it must never be forgotten that they are often give against a different 
constitutional, legal and social background from that which exists in Australia’: ibid 652. 
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splitting’.51  Chief Justice Barwick said that the Australian words prohibited ‘the making of a 
law for establishing a religion’.52  Despite the contrary interpretation of the US First 
Amendment words, there was no ambiguity53 in the purposive Australian language.54  Gibbs J 
said that it was ‘impossible to say … that the challenged legislation has the purpose or effect 
of setting up any religion or religious body as a state religion or a state church’.55  Stephen J 
said that he thought ‘“establishing” mean[t] the constituting of a religion as an officially 
recognized State religion’.56  Gibbs and Stephen JJ both rejected Murphy J’s propositions that 
the US First Amendment forbade the funding of religious education by the time that the 
Australian Constitution was enacted57 and that s 116 of the Australian Constitution must 
therefore have been intended to enact the same prohibition.58  Stephen and Wilson JJ also 
rejected Murphy J’s acceptance of the plaintiffs’ argument that section 116 constituted a rights 
guarantee of some kind.59  They said it only operated as a prohibition on Commonwealth 
legislative power.60  In consequence of the fact that section 116 was not a rights guarantee, 
Wilson J also rejected Murphy J’s assertion that because section 116 involved a constitutional 
guarantee of the rights of the states and the citizens, it should be interpreted in broad general 
terms.61  Wilson J said that while it was true that ‘constitutional grant[s] of plenary power 
should be construed with all the generality which the words used will admit … the same [wa]s 
not true of a provision which proscribes power’.62  
 
Wilson J read s 116 as ‘forbidding any law for establishing any religion or any form of any 
religion.63  But Mason J’s interpretation of the Australian establishment clause was the 
narrowest of all.  He agreed with Wilson J, but qualified further and added: 
 
[T]o constitute ‘establishment’ of a ‘religion’ the concession to one church of favours, titles and 
advantages must be of so special a kind that it enables us to say that by virtue of the concession the 
religion has become established as a national institution, as, for example, by becoming the official 
religion of the state.64 
 
The lowest common denominator of these five separate majority judgments (including one by 
the serving Chief Justice of Australia and two from future Chief Justices of Australia), is that 
the words ‘shall not make any law for establishing any religion’ do not prevent anything other 
than the establishment of a national church or religion.  This reasoning stands in sharp contrast 
to the equivalent authority of Justice Hugo Black’s assertion in the United States that very 
similar words mean a lot more than that in the US,65 suggesting at least that Australia and the 
US are another two countries ‘separated’ by a common language.66 
 
                                                     
51 DOGS case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 632. 
52 Ibid 583. 
53 Ibid 578. 
54 Ibid 579. 
55 Ibid 604. 
56 Ibid 605. 
57 Ibid 624-627. 
58 Ibid 599-600 (Gibbs J); 609-610 (Stephen J). 
59 Ibid 622-624, 632-634. 
60 Ibid 604 (Stephen J); 648, 652 (Wilson J). 
61 Ibid 622 and 632. 
62 Ibid 653. 
63 Ibid 655. 
64 Ibid 612. 
65 Above n 13 and supporting text. 
66 A witticism variously attributed to Oscar Wilde, George Bernard Shaw and Winston Churchill. 
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Two of the Australian High Court judges also considered that the Australian establishment 
clause could not represent a mandate for state-church separation since that broad general 
reading of the clause would have made the third and fourth clauses of s 116 of the Australian 
Constitution redundant.67  While the US First Amendment does not contain similar clauses 
prohibiting the enforcement of any religious observance or the imposition of religious tests for 
public offices or trusts, similar prohibitions do exist elsewhere in the US Bill of Rights68 – 
meaning that these Australian High Court judges seem to deny that even the broader words of 
the US First Amendment required the separationist meaning given them in US Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.69 
 
However, a comparison of the US and Australian establishment clause language is incomplete 
if we just look at the judgments.  There also has to be an understanding that the jurisprudential 
differences between the two countries are not just about the words the different framers chose 
to express their restrictions on federal government involvement in religion in the future.  There 
are cultural overlays that are beyond the scope of this paper, but there are also different judicial 
conventions which are not accounted for in the foregoing comparison.  
 
Foremost among those is the different approach that judges in the US and Australia take to 
judicial review.  Ever since Marbury v Madison70 was decided in the US, US judges have been 
authorised to strike down federal (and later state) legislation that offended the Constitution 
including the Bill of Rights which became a part of that Constitution by virtue of the first Ten 
Amendments.  Australian judges cannot do that.  For one thing, Australia has no federal 
constitutional bill of rights so that the ambit of the High Court’s power to review legislation 
for consistency with the Constitution is more limited than it is for the US Supreme Court.  And 
secondly, there is the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, which holds that Parliament, rather 
than the courts, have the final say as to what the law shall be by virtue of their electoral mandate.  
Certainly the High Court of Australia can declare federal legislation invalid if it is beyond the 
power of the Commonwealth Parliament to enact it, but no Australian court can strike down 
legislation because it is incompatible with human rights values unless a plaintiff or appellant 
can point to those values in the express words or necessary implications of the Australian 
Constitution itself.71  And referenda results are much more difficult if not impossible to unsettle 
because they are the ultimate primary evidence of popular intent.  
 
 
Though this international discussion demonstrates that the US Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is unique, it also shows that jurisdictions outside the US do not accept that the 
prohibition of religious establishment and the separation of church and state are a requirement 
for religious freedom in any nation.  This insight serves as an appropriate introduction to the 
philosophical thought of John Rawls about religious freedom that follows.  It is a premise of 
                                                     
67 DOGS case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 616 (Stephen J); 654-55 (Wilson J). 
68 Art VI, para 3 of the US Constitution itself provides that ‘no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification 
to any office or public trust under the United States’. 
69 Note however, that the US First Amendment is arguably broader than s 116 of the Australian Constitution 
because it not only uses the word ‘respecting’ rather than ‘for’, but also because it omits the word ‘any’ to qualify 
‘religion’. 
70 5 US 137 (1803). 
71 Even ratification of international human rights by the Australian Executive does not enable the federal courts 
in Australia to declare Commonwealth domestic legislation invalid because it is inconsistent with international 
norms. That is because it is well settled that international instruments including treaties are only binding when 
they have been implemented into Australian domestic law by follow on legislation. See for example, Chow Hung 
Ching v The King (1948) 77 CLR 449. 
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this article, that John Rawls was raised in a legal and philosophical environment that accepted 
without question, that church and state must be separated and religious establishment forbidden 
if religious liberty was to prosper.  Rawls does not anywhere overtly state his acceptance or 
belief in that proposition.  But it is the premise of this article that Rawls accepted it as ‘the 
gospel’ without critical analysis.  Part II of this article will therefore outline Rawls’ thought, 
drawing attention to this ‘assumption proposition’ only when necessary to identify and test it. 
 
III    THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN RAWLS:  
A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) 
 
Rawls' Theory of Justice grew out of his concern that utilitarian ideas could not produce a just 
society.72  He believed that because all competent human beings share an innate sense of 
justice,73 it was possible to conceive and create a truly just society.74  The utilitarian aspiration 
to create a system that provided 'the greatest good to the greatest number' suppressed minority 
interests completely and that does not feel naturally just to anyone.  Rawls suggested that most 
of us would come to the same conclusions about what constitutes a just society, if we made 
those decisions behind a 'veil of ignorance' from an 'original position'.75  Those conclusions 
would not be utilitarian.76  Rawls says that the political and legal system we would choose from 
the neutral vantage point of his 'original position' would be just and fair.  We would choose the 
best option if we did not know even generally what our particular circumstances would be 
when we had our turn on earth.77  An enlightened theoretical self-interest would displace the 
practical self-interest that drives existing human societies in the present.78  Rawls believed that 
the systems we would all innately choose from behind his veil of ignorance in the original 
position, would yield fairness to all and not just to the majority, as in utilitarian philosophy, or 
to oligarchical power elites as feared in marxist philosophy.79  If the answers human beings 
seek to questions of law and practice were worked out from the perspective of the original 
position, we could edge our way towards a truly just society in the present. 
 
Rawls did not think religious groups were any more trustworthy than other majoritarian or elite 
groups wielding power in human society.80  History was full of examples where religious 
                                                     
72 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1999) xi-xii (preface), 19-24.  In the preface to the 
original 1971 edition, Rawls said he was seeking to construct a ‘systematic moral conception’ to oppose the 
utilitarian by ‘carry[ing] to a higher level of abstraction the traditional theory of the social contract as represented 
by Locke, Rousseau and Kant’: at  xvii-xviii. 
73 Note, however, that Rawls distinguishes his theory of justice from what he calls ‘intuitionism’: ibid 20, 30-36. 
His theory of justice ‘is a theory of moral sentiments ... setting out the principles governing our moral powers, or, 
more specifically, our sense of justice’: ibid 44.  Contract doctrine ‘fill[s the] gap’ between intuitionism and 
perfectionism: ibid 46.  But Rawls still accepts that his reasoning ‘is highly intuitive throughout’: ibid 105. 
74 Ibid 8 where Rawls states ‘that the nature and aims of a perfectly just society is the fundamental part of the 
theory of justice’. 
75 Ibid 11. 
76 Ibid 13. 
77 While Rawls' theory of justice was developed to explain justice as fairness in an entirely neutral way, his 
undergirding idea of ‘the original position’ has clear theological history.  See for eg, Terryl Givens, When Souls 
had Wings: Pre-Mortal Existence in Western Thought (Oxford University Press, 2010) 1-8. 
78 Rawls describes his theory as a theory of ‘rational choice’: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University 
Press, 1999) 15. 
79 Marx famously theorised that the ‘the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles’ and 
that the various classes clash when their self-interests collide: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist 
Manifesto (1848). 
80 See for eg, John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ in John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard 
University Press, 1999) 149 where he notes that ‘Catholics and Protestants in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
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groups suppressed others as soon as they acquired the reins of power despite their 'golden rule' 
pretensions.  That concern with human self-interest saw Rawls discuss the place of tolerance 
in connection with freedom of conscience and speech in A Theory of Justice, long before he 
articulated his idea of public reason.  
 
Since people in the original position, ‘do not know ... what their religious or moral convictions 
are ... [t]he question they are to decide is which principle they should adopt to regulate the 
liberties of citizens in regard to their fundamental religious, moral and philosophical 
interests.’81  He concluded quite simply that  
 
equal liberty of conscience is the only principle that the persons in the original position can acknowledge.  
They cannot take their chances with their liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine 
to persecute or to suppress others if it wishes.82 
 
Rawls discussed whether it is just for parents or other ancestors to choose equal liberty of 
conscience on behalf of their descendants, and concluded that since persons in the original 
position know no ‘more about their descendants than they know about themselves’,83 their 
decisions are just even if they bind all generations. But equal liberty of conscience is not 
absolute.  It ‘is limited...by the common interest in public order and security’84 since from the 
original position, each would recognize ‘that the disruption of [public order and security] is a 
danger for the liberty of all’.85  He also denied ‘the notion of the omnicompetent laicist state, 
since from the principles of justice it follows that government has neither the right nor the duty 
to do what it or a majority ... wants to do in questions of morals and religion.’86  Even though 
‘an intolerant sect has no title to complain when it is denied an equal liberty’87 since it cannot 
claim reciprocal treatment88 if it would not accord such treatment, ‘[w]e still cannot say that 
tolerant sects have the right to suppress the [intolerant].’89  That someone is ‘intolerant of 
another is [not] grounds for limiting someone's liberty’.90  While ‘[j]ustice does not require that 
men stand idly by while others destroy the basis of their existence’, ‘when the constitution itself 
is secure, there is no reason to deny freedom to the intolerant’.91  The only reason why the 
denial of such freedom could be justified was if ‘this is necessary for the sake of equal liberty 
itself’92 as for example when the constitution was not secure.93  The need to preserve equal 
liberty itself was the only principle which could justly limit equal liberty of conscience.  Rawls 
                                                     
centuries [honored] ... the principle of toleration ... only as a modus vivendi.  This meant that should either party 
fully gain its way it would impose its own religious doctrine as the sole admissible faith.’ 
81 Rawls, above n 72, 181. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid 183. 
84 Ibid 186. 
85 Ibid 187. 
86 Ibid 186-87. 
87 Ibid 190. 
88 Rawls’ ‘reciprocity principle’ may be simply understood as the golden rule of Christianity.  Accordingly, in 
this example, an intolerant sect cannot expect tolerance from other sects.  Note that Professor Durham has 
documented the existence of a principle equivalent to the golden rule of Christianity (and thus to Rawls' reciprocity 
principle) in every major religion in the world: W Cole Durham Jr, ‘The Doctrine of Religious Freedom’ (Speech 
delivered on 3 April 2001) n 18 Speeches <http://speeches.byu.edu/reader/reader.php?id=880>. 
89 Rawls, above n 72, 191. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid 192. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid 192-94. 
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believed that all would agree to this limiting principle from the standpoint of the original 
position.94 
 
In Rawls’ Theory of Justice, there is no obvious US establishment clause paradigm of thought 
evident.95  What he wrote there about equal liberty of conscience is consistent with both the 
conception of freedom of religion in US First and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and 
in international human rights instruments including the UDHR, the ICCPR and the Elimination 
of Religious Intolerance Declaration though he did not mention any of those documents. 
 
How did Rawls get from such a generally acceptable expression of the idea of freedom of 
conscience and belief to the idea that some expressions of belief were inappropriate in the 
public square even though they represented no threat to equal liberty itself?  How did he justify 
the abrogation of freedom of conscience and belief that seems implicit to so many in his idea 
of ‘public reason’? 
 
Rawls’ idea of ‘public reason’ was developed in his theoretical quest for an overlapping 
consensus such as might stabilise and strengthen all liberal democracies.  It was first proposed 
in his 1993 book entitled Political Liberalism96 and further developed in his 1999 article 
entitled ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’.97  He saw these new works as a continuation of 
what he had written in A Theory of Justice.  ‘In a nearly just society there is a public acceptance 
of the same principles of justice’.98  But there does not need to be complete agreement.  There 
can even be ‘considerable differences in citizen's conceptions of justice provided that these 
conceptions all lead to similar political judgments’.99  ‘[D]ifferent premises can yield the same 
conclusion’100 and therefore groups with different perspectives can accept the same judgment 
in a dispute though for different reasons.  However, ‘there comes a point beyond which the 
requisite agreement in judgment breaks down and society splits...on fundamental questions’.101  
Responsible citizens will not then do as they please. While they may act conscientiously and 
disobey law, yet they will be held responsible for what they do.102  Citizens responding to such 
differences should sacrifice their comprehensive doctrines in the interests of preserving the 
overlapping consensus necessary to preserve society when viewed from the original position. 
To use Rawls' own words: 
 
Citizens realize that they cannot reach agreement or even approach mutual understanding on the basis of 
their irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines.  In view of this, they need to consider what kinds of reasons 
they may reasonably give one another when fundamental political questions are at stake.  I propose that 
in Public Reason comprehensive doctrines of truth or right be replaced by an idea of the politically 
reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens.103 
 
                                                     
94 Ibid 193-94. 
95 However, note that Professor Thomas Pogge at Yale University, who wrote his doctoral dissertation under 
Rawls’ supervision at Harvard, has observed that Rawls was ‘fundamentally focused on domestic [America]’ in 
all his work.  While he believed the US should play a leading role in the world as the repository of justice in 
accord with the ‘city on a hill’ metaphor, Rawls was not really concerned with foreign policy 
<http://www.patheos.com/blogs/approachingjustice/2013/04/26/thomas-pogge-on-studying-under-john-rawls/>.  
96 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993). 
97 Rawls, above n 80. 
98 Rawls, above n 72, 340. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid.  
102 Ibid 341. 
103 Rawls, above n 80, 131-32. 
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For Rawls, equal liberty of conscience was not compromised by this citizen sacrifice of those 
parts of their comprehensive doctrines which lie outside the overlapping consensus, because it 
was a voluntary sacrifice made in the interests of the peaceful and secure continuation of their 
society.  It was also justified because it was a reciprocal sacrifice made by all citizens in the 
interests of the greater good.104  This sacrifice or mutual forbearance,105 was a citizen ‘duty of 
civility’106 but for Rawls, it was a moral duty rather than a legal duty.107  Comprehensive 
doctrines, including religious doctrines, may only enter political debate, if they are ‘proper 
political reasons’108 and manifest ‘commitment to constitutional democracy’.109  In 
demonstration of the neutrality of his concept of Public Reason, Rawls says that secular 
arguments premised in ‘a worthy idea of full human good’ are no more acceptable in the public 
square than religious arguments.  Thus statutes forbidding homosexual relations may only be 
discussed in terms of the relevant civil rights rather than whether they are good, or bad or 
sinful110 – though it is unclear from Rawls' text why the moral quality of homosexual relations 
is not something upon which one could have an opinion in the original position.111 
 
Some colleagues have suggested that my characterisation of Rawls’ understanding of liberty 
of conscience is unjust because I infer that he abandoned liberty of conscience as a sacrificial 
lamb on an altar of overlapping consensus.  I do not think Rawls believed he was sacrificing 
liberty of conscience at all. Rawls believed that all he wrote preserved liberty of conscience.  
My point is that his US context blinded him, at least in part, to an understanding that his 
‘proviso’ in ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ substantially undermined liberty of 
conscience as understood in international human rights instruments.  In his own words: 
 
[R]easonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in public political 
discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons – and not reasons given solely 
by comprehensive doctrines – are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive 
doctrines are said to support.112 
 
Rawls’ belief that there is a need to justify comprehensive doctrines including religious 
comprehensive religious doctrines with “proper political reasons” misunderstands and 
diminishes freedom of speech including freedom of religious speech, as well as liberty of 
conscience.  It misunderstands both freedoms because it infers that they are not self-evident.  It 
diminishes them because it requires them to justify themselves in a better language even though 
true freedom is allowed to speak for itself.  I elaborate upon these and other objections to 
Rawls’ idea of public reason in the next two sections of this article. 
                                                     
104 Ibid 135-36, 138.  I note that this use of partially utilitarian language may have galled Rawls who wrote his 
theory of justice to avoid the need to resort to utilitarianism as a philosophical explanation for political liberalism. 
But here ‘the greater good’ is not really utilitarian because it is ‘the greater good as viewed from the original 
position’ rather than ‘the greater good of the majority’.  
105 ‘Sacrifice’ and ‘mutual forbearance’ are my words, not Rawls’. Rawls never speaks of a sacrifice though he 
does expect that those who hold comprehensive doctrines which are either incompatible with the possibility of an 
overlapping consensus (and thus, long term, the peaceful continuation of the state), should not express them unless 
they can articulate them in a manner comprehensible to all: Rawls, above n 80, 144, 152-56. 
106 Rawls, above n 80, 135, 154. 
107 Ibid 136-37. 
108 Ibid 152. 
109 Ibid 153-54. 
110 Ibid 148. 
111 I note, however, that an essential part of the argument that takes the morality of homosexual relations outside 
the scope of discussion in the public square, is that gay people do not choose their sexual orientation or were ‘born 
that way’.  Given this perspective, it is arguable that no one would have chosen laws which discriminate against 
gay people from the original position since anyone could then have been born gay. 
112 Rawls, above n 80, 152. 
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A     Some Criticism that Suggests Rawlsian Public Reason Does Not Respect  
Free Religious Speech 
 
When Rawls revisited his idea of public reason in 1997, he did not believe it compromised the 
equal liberty of conscience that he had outlined in his Theory of Justice in 1971.  Before I 
review Rawls’ belief that his idea of public reason is consistent with his own 1971 explanation 
of what is meant by equal liberty of conscience, I outline some of the general criticisms to 
which Rawls’ idea of public reason has been subject.  Thereafter, I seek to unpack the question 
of whether his idea of public reason demonstrates that his conception of equal liberty of 
conscience has been tainted by US establishment clause jurisprudence. 
 
Rawls’ idea of public reason has been the subject of significant criticism because many 
consider that it does not adequately respect free religious speech.  Jeremy Waldron has said 
that most representations of religious arguments in the public square are crude caricatures and 
are unfavourably compared with the elegant complexity of the philosophical theories of Rawls 
and Dworkin.113  But these characterisations are mostly a travesty114 and understanding those 
arguments can and should deepen and enrich our understanding of equality as well as ‘our 
sense of what it is like to make a religious argument in politics’.115  Indeed, ‘it may be 
impossible to articulate certain important egalitarian commitments without appealing to what 
one takes to be their religious grounds. If so the Rawlsian exclusion seems unreasonable’.116  
And this writer adds, unreasonable not only on the ground that it excludes important 
contributions from the debate, but unreasonable because it unjustly excludes some citizens 
from contributing their expertise to the debate at all.117  Waldron is also concerned in 
consequence that ‘basic equality is now under attack by sophisticated bodies of theory, which 
have as their aim the establishment of political power on an inegalitarian basis.’118 
 
John Finnis is vaguely charitable when he attributes Rawls' exclusion of ‘certain kinds of true 
and philosophically warranted propositions ... from the processes of public deliberation ... on 
the grounds that they are not sufficiently widely accepted.’119  Finnis says Rawls' arguments 
are equivocal, arbitrary, clumsy and ramshackle.120  He continues, citing Eisgruber and Sager's 
book, Religious Freedom and the Constitution:121  
 
They have no time for Rawlsian proposals to expel from the public domain all religious arguments or 
grounds for decision-making; they share ... Dworkin's (and Joseph Raz's) healthy skepticism about that 
ramshackle Rawlsian project – he calls it 'political liberalism' – which in all really important decisions 
about human rights and the common good would banish concern for truth and in its place put an 
imaginary overlapping consensus of the 'reasonable' views of all 'reasonable' people (views supposedly 
                                                     
113 Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political Thought (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 20. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid 237. 
117 Here I refer to the exclusion of those religious thinkers who do not feel competent with the language of public 
reason.  This idea is discussed in more detail below. 
118 Waldron, n 113, 238. 
119 John Finnis, Religion and Public Reasons: Collected Essays Volume V (Oxford University Press, 2011) 4. 
120 Ibid 4, 6, 18. 
121 Christopher L Eisgruber and Larry G Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution (Harvard University 
Press, 2007).  
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identifiable as reasonable without reflection on their truth).  They hold – rightly, I think – that in these 
matters neutrality is not an option.122  
 
Steven Smith criticises what he calls ‘the secular government position’123 espoused by Rawls 
among others, which he says would interpret the US Constitution to render 'religious' interests 
illegitimate.124  Smith’s concern is that it is frequently impossible in practice to distinguish 
between what is and is not supposed to be illegitimate because religious ideas and reasons are 
laced through so many issues in American politics.  His hypothetical example from Kent 
Greenawalt, which he says ‘blends a bit of Noah and a whiff of Nostradamus’,125 suggests this 
reasoning would make it illegitimate for government to make secular preparations for a flood 
if lobbied to do so by religionists, but not if that view were expressed by climate change 
specialists with scientific evidence to back it up.126  He then discusses three different kinds of 
‘goods’ to try and work out whether it would be illegitimate for a politically liberal government 
to promote them.127  Two are unmistakably religious – the 'Christian idea that it is good to be 
saved', and the 'idea that obedience to God' is good128 - and a third more secular idea that a life 
focused on family is better than a life spent guzzling beer on the couch watching NASCAR or 
cage wrestling.129  But even the first two overtly religious ideas have their ethical counterparts 
when non-religious people express what Professor Edward Rubin calls a ‘morality of self-
fulfillment’ as distinct from the older religious ‘morality of higher purpose’,130 or when they 
agree that any instruction which encourages obedience to law is good for society.  
 
Professor Smith's questions are – ‘is [there] a set of “interests” – end, or goods – that are off 
limits to government because the goods themselves are “religious” in nature[?]’131 - and how 
do you tell and who tells the difference?  His conclusion is that making judgments of this kind 
seems to involve government decisions of ‘exactly the kind ... that the American adoption of 
religious freedom was meant to repudiate.’132  While  
 
prominent thinkers like John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin sometimes suggest that government must be 
neutral with respect to ‘the good’ or ‘the good life … neither American constitutional law nor American 
political practice embrace this sort of restriction.  On the contrary ... a good deal of political and 
governmental activity is devoted precisely to the effort to express, ascertain and implement the citizens' 
views about what makes for a good life (or good lives) and a good society.133 
 
These three writers are not satisfied that limiting public debate to the language of Public Reason 
does not abrogate or limit freedom of speech, conscience and belief.  But theirs are not the only 
concerns.  Other concerns include the idea that Public Reason discriminates against the 
uneducated in society; is coercive or intolerant of ideas which are not programmed with its 
                                                     
122 Finnis, above n 119, 18. 
123 Steven D Smith, The Constitution and the Goods of Religion, University of San Diego School of Law Research 
Paper Series, Research Paper No 10-059 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1879398> 7. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid 8.  Note also that the Smith/Greenawalt example is the idea behind the plot in the Hollywood blockbuster 
movie, ‘2012’. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid 9-12. 
128 Ibid 9-10. 
129 Ibid 11. 
130 Ibid 9, quoting Edward L Rubin, ‘Sex, Politics and Morality’ (2005) 47 William and Mary Law Review 1. Note 
from Smith that Professor Rubin says that ‘for political and legal purposes the First Amendment's Establishment 
Clause prohibits coercive laws based on the morality of higher purpose’: Smith, above n 123, 3, citing Rubin, 34. 
131 Ibid 8.  
132 Ibid 14. 
133 Ibid 15. 
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paradigm; and that the voluntary limitation of the language of public debate is not justified by 
equal liberty itself.  This last unanswered concern is ironic since in A Theory of Justice in 1971, 
Rawls restated seven times between pages 186 and 188134 that the only justification for the 
abrogation of any freedom was the risk that the exercise of that freedom might place freedom 
itself in clear and present danger. 
 
Briefly stated, the discrimination criticism is that the less educated in society are unlikely to 
have the confidence and vocabulary to express themselves in the language of public reason and 
so will be marginalised in a society where debate is limited in any way.  Uneducated religious 
believers may be even more marginalised by public reason since they have the double hurdles 
of vocabulary and translation to surmount before their views will be considered in the public 
square.  That result is surprising since Rawls went to such trouble in A Theory of Justice to 
explain why the intolerant should still be tolerated except when the constitution was under 
threat.135  
 
The coercion criticism is that equal liberty of conscience as expressed in A Theory of Justice, 
cannot coexist with the voluntary and self-disciplined limitation of speech which Rawls called 
for in his idea of Public Reason.  That is because, in the original position, no one would ‘take 
chances with their liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine to persecute 
or to suppress [it]’.136  The difficulty in avoiding the dominance of any single religious or moral 
doctrine, acknowledged in A Theory of Justice,137 counsels that we not narrow the quest for 
overlapping consensus so much that we would ‘ask [religious believers] to recognize us as the 
proper interpreter of their religious duties or moral obligations’.138 
 
Rawls’ idea of public reason creates the sense that he grew less patient as he grew older.  The 
hope that good or best theory would triumph in the marketplace of ideas as the invisible hand 
worked its magic à la Milton139 and Adam Smith,140 was replaced with an agenda that insisted 
on an overlapping consensus come what may, though Rawls himself never used the language 
of coercion or revolution.  Though Rawls never admitted it, many commentators since141 have 
observed that coercion was latent in Political Liberalism142 and ‘The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited’.143  
 
Though Rawls believed that his idea of Public Reason did not compromise the equal liberty of 
conscience that he had outlined in his Theory of Justice in 1971, the discussion above suggests 
there are inconsistencies.  These inconsistencies and the question whether they are attributable 
in any measure to US establishment clause jurisprudence is discussed below.  
 
                                                     
134 Rawls, above n 72. 
135 Ibid 190-94. 
136 Ibid 181. 
137 Ibid 182. 
138 Ibid 183. 
139 John Milton, Areopagitica (1644). 
140 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Harriman House Ltd, 1776) 
(reprinted in 2007). 
141 Jeremy Waldron (above n 113) notes Robert Audi, ‘Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of 
Citizenship’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989) 259-296; Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and 
Political Choice, Oxford University Press (1988) and Thomas Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy”, 
11 Philosophy and Public Affairs (1980) 215-240 ‘in support of something like the Rawlsian position’), 237.  
142 Rawls, above n 96. 
143 Rawls, above n 80. 
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B     Inconsistencies between Rawlsian Public Reason  
and Equal Liberty of Conscience 
 
The foregoing discussion suggests that public reason is inconsistent with Rawls’ own 
conception of equal liberty of conscience for at least, the following six reasons.  First, in taking 
up Jeremy Waldron’s point, that because Rawls does not understand religious reasons his 
descriptions of those reasons are caricatures of them.144  When a person is committed to 
religious values, she lives those values in every aspect of her life.  Her values are part of her 
human character and dignity.  Her religious beliefs explain every decision she makes.  Every 
time she encounters a legal or a political issue in the public square, she understands and 
responds to that issue in an integrated holistic way which includes her religious experience, 
values and commitments. Rawls’ idea of Public Reason expects that she will be able to and 
will agree to set the religious part of her identity to one side if she chooses to respond to legal 
and political issues in the public square.  But if she even agrees that such division of her nature 
is possible, she will feel that she would lack integrity to do so.  To ask her to consider dividing 
her nature in this Rawlsian way, is to denigrate her dignity and to dictate another set of values 
on top of those she has chosen to live and has woven through her nature. 
 
Steven Smith makes the same point when he says it is impossible to distinguish between what 
is and is not supposed to be legitimate because religious ideas and reasons are laced through so 
many issues in American politics.145  While Jeremy Waldron points to the devaluation of 
individual human dignity that is implicit in public reason,146 Steven Smith says, neither the 
individual nor society could ever be completely sure that we had satisfactorily excluded 
religious reasons from our decision making if we were minded to try.147  It can thus be 
concluded that Public Reason is inconsistent with equal liberty of conscience, because the 
devaluation of human dignity is anathema to that liberty and secondly, because it is futile to try 
and exclude religious reasons from public discussion and decision-making.  Hereafter in this 
article, I shall refer to these as the ‘devaluation of human dignity’ and ‘futility’ reasons why 
public reason is inconsistent with equal liberty of conscience. 
 
Finnis, Eisgruber and Sagar record a third reason why Rawlsian public reason is inconsistent 
with equal liberty of conscience.  They say that Rawlsian public reason would banish concern 
for objective truth from all discussion in the public square.148  Their concern is that unless 
overlapping consensus accidentally coincides with what was objectively the right and true 
response in any public square discussion, the need for overlapping consensus would trump the 
quest for the truth or the right no matter how bad the resulting compromise.149  Because this is 
a concern born of the postmodern debate about whether there is any such thing as absolute 
truth, I shall call this objection or inconsistency between Rawlsian public reason and equal 
liberty of conscience, the ‘relativist’ inconsistency.  
 
I have already labeled (in earlier discussions) three further inconsistencies between Rawlsian 
public reason and equal liberty of conscience, representing: fourth, the ‘discrimination’ reason, 
fifth, the ‘coercion’ reason and sixth, the ‘inequality’ reason.  Rawlsian public reason is 
inconsistent with equal liberty of conscience because it discriminates against people in society 
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who are not educated, competent and confident enough to use the language of public reason 
when legal and political matters arise for discussion in the public square.  Rawlsian public 
reason is inconsistent with equal liberty of conscience because it coerces people to leave their 
religious values and beliefs behind them when they discuss anything in the public square and 
Rawlsian public reason would put religious believers at an unequal disadvantage in public 
square discussion and debate since it prevents religious believers from expressing themselves 
in the language most familiar to them. 
 
If equal liberty of conscience rather than public reason were the standard governing citizen 
involvement in public square debate, there would be no exclusion for any of these six reasons.  
That is, equal liberty of conscience would not devalue human dignity because it would allow 
all citizens to participate in public square debate with and without religious reasons.  There 
would be no need for a futile effort to exclude religious reasons from public discussion.  All 
those participating in such discussion could express their vision of the good, true and right 
regardless of any predetermined necessity for overlapping consensus, and in consequence, 
there would be no institutionalised discrimination against any debate participants, no coercive 
exclusion of any words they might choose when expressing themselves, and there would be an 
overriding sense that they all had equal access to the microphone. 
 
Where then did this anti-libertarian Rawlsian idea of public reason come from, and how could 
John Rawls possibly have considered that his idea was consistent with equal liberty of 
conscience?  The answer is not obvious and cannot be proven beyond doubt since John Rawls 
did not concede that his idea of public reason was inconsistent with equal liberty of conscience, 
and he did not write anything that confessed he had changed his mind about the essential 
elements of equal liberty of conscience.  However, the fact that his idea of public reason is 
consistent with US establishment clause jurisprudence and that the US establishment clause 
jurisprudence of his ‘public reason’ years has come to constitute American orthodoxy on the 
nature of equal liberty of conscience, is no small coincidence.  John Rawls was steeped in 
American jurisprudential orthodoxy throughout his life. Even his magnum opus, A Theory of 
Justice in 1971, makes no reference to conceptions of religious liberty beyond the US.  I shall 
therefore conclude this part by arguing that John Rawls’ idea of public reason is inconsistent 
with equal liberty of conscience precisely to the extent that his idea of public reason accords 
with US establishment clause jurisprudence. 
 
C     Rawlsian Public Reason, US Establishment Clause Jurisprudence  
and Equal Liberty of Conscience 
 
Rawls did not isolate a definition of equal liberty of conscience that he accepted as his 
foundation.  In A Theory of Justice, he simply wrote that ‘the question of equal liberty of 
conscience was settled’150 and that ‘[i]t is one of the fixed points of our considered judgments 
of justice.’151  As earlier quoted he also wrote that 
 
equal liberty of conscience is the only principle that the persons in the original position can acknowledge. 
They cannot take their chances with their liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine 
to persecute or to suppress others if it wishes.152 
 
                                                     
150 Above n 80, 181. 
151 Ibid.  
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But equal liberty of conscience was not absolute.  It ‘is limited ... by the common interest in 
public order and security’153 since from the original position, each would recognize ‘that the 
disruption of [public order and security] is a danger for the liberty of all’.154 
 
While these statements accord with those expressed in art 18 of both the UDHR and ICCPR, 
Rawls’ US focus and understanding is given away in his statements above155 that the question 
of equal liberty of conscience is both ‘settled’ and a ‘fixed point’ in ‘our considered judgments 
of justice’.  Though Rawls does not attribute the ‘fixed point metaphor’, it is a reasonably 
obvious reference to the same metaphor used by Justice Robert H Jackson in his majority 
opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette in 1943 as appears in the passage 
below:  
 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that not official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.  If there are any circumstances which permit an 
exception, they not now occur to us.156 
 
The ‘fixed point’ referred to in the Justice Jackson metaphor was the meaning of the US First 
Amendment and particularly the meaning of the free exercise clause.  In that case, the Supreme 
Court decided that Jehovah’s Witness school children could not be forced to salute the 
American flag even though the country was deeply involved in World War II.  
 
If Rawls’ allusion in his ‘settled’ definition of equal liberty of conscience was to Justice 
Jackson’s majority opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, then it is 
ironical for Rawls on a number of fronts.  First, though the case was argued under both the free 
exercise and free speech clauses of the First Amendment, it was decided under the free speech 
clause.  The decision was that the choice of the Jehovah’s Witness school children not to salute 
the flag was a matter of free speech and they were free to state their religious beliefs, in the 
public square, by not saluting the flag.  Second, Rawls chose to allude to the pro-free speech 
majority judgment of Justice Jackson rather than the minority judgment of Justice Frankfurter 
who said that freedom of religion did not allow these children to breach this West Virginia law 
just because it offended their consciences.  And finally, the allusion in his 1971 book is ironic 
since that was the year the Supreme Court established its ‘excessive entanglement’ test in 
Lemon v Kurtman, a test which further unsettled the constellation of US establishment clause 
jurisprudence. 
 
The point is that Rawls’ opinion seems to have tracked the opinion of the US Supreme Court.  
For in 1971 when he published A Theory of Justice, freedom of religious speech was ascendant.  
But from the year when his proofs of A Theory of Justice went to the publishers, the fixed 
points began to change.  Certainly Justice Hugo Black had signaled change where the 
establishment clause was concerned in Everson v Board of Education in 1947, but Justice 
Black’s establishment clause jurisprudence did not fully bite until Lemon v Kurtman in 1971 
after A Theory of Justice went to press.  Save for the school prayer cases, the eye-catching First 
Amendment cases of the previous decade concerned the free exercise and free speech clauses 
and liberty of the subject had been the focus of the Supreme Court’s attention. 
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Perhaps the case that set Rawls to thinking about public reason was Employment Division v 
Smith in 1991.157  In a sense, that case homogenised all the First Amendment clause 
jurisprudence.  For if government could not pass laws that dictated any measure of religion to 
society, then citizens should not be granted religious exemptions from laws that did not single 
them out.  The Supreme Court’s decision not to allow Al Smith a religious exemption from 
generally applicable drug laws so that he could smoke the hallucinogenic drug peyote in his 
native American religion, was philosophically consistent with the idea that freedom of 
conscience did not justify citizens breaking the law as Justice Frankfurter had said in his dissent 
in West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette in 1943.  In the Employment Division v 
Smith decision, the Supreme Court adopted the same version of neutrality towards religion that 
it had developed in Establishment Clause cases since 1971, but this time, in a Free Exercise 
case.  This was close to a sea change for US Free Exercise jurisprudence since, beginning with 
Sherbert v Verner in 1963, the Supreme Court had used the general civil rights ‘strict scrutiny’ 
standard to insist that government laws which burdened the free exercise of religion were 
invalid unless there was no other way for government to achieve an otherwise legitimate 
objective.158  Employment Division v Smith wound back the clock so that government had the 
benefit of the doubt and the philosophy governing its decisions under both religion clauses 
became the same.  After Employment Division v Smith, the same separationist philosophy 
which forbade any US government endorsement of a religious message in its administration or 
legislation, required that religious practice be subject to generally applicable law unless it had 
been singled out in a non-neutral manner. 
 
Post 1971 US Supreme Court jurisprudence on the First Amendment thus turned Rawls’ 1971 
understanding of equal liberty of conscience on its head.  The post 1991 blended First 
Amendment jurisprudence held that complete separation of church and state was an essential 
part of neutral religious freedom.  Even when the Supreme Court recalled Justice Burger’s 
1970 statement that there should be ‘play in the joints’ between the religion clauses in 2005,159 
there was the subliminal message that the neutrality required under Establishment Clause 
would trump equal liberty of conscience under the Free Exercise clause since ‘there [we]re 
some actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise 
Clause’.160  The ‘play in the joints’ between the clauses was no longer a suggestion that the two 
clauses had separate work to do in protecting religious freedom generally.  It was a metaphor 
to remind legislators, administrators and judges that they did not need to exclude every 
religious symbol or utterance from the public square – the well established historical iconic 
examples could remain because they had lost their religious message and did not prejudice the 
‘American is a neutral secular state’ orthodoxy. 
 
Accordingly, John Rawls may have been confused.  There was no reference to any ‘fixed 
points’ in our ‘considered judgments of justice’161 in either Political Liberalism in 1993 or ‘The 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ in 1997.  That is because there were no fixed points any 
longer. Equal liberty of conscience was in a state of flux in America.  And so, in his effort to 
make sense of equal liberty of conscience, John Rawls proposed Public Reason.  When the 
development of his reasoning is reviewed in its US political and jurisprudential context, it is 
obvious that he was trying to shore up his theory so that it would continue to have explanatory 
power in the future since his 1971 concept of equal liberty of conscience did not explain what 
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was happening in the jurisprudence any more.  The reason why he denied that his concepts of 
‘equal liberty of conscience’ and Public Reason, were inconsistent, was because the US 
Supreme Court still paid lip service to ‘free exercise’ which was the phrase from which Rawls 
had extracted his 1971 concept of ‘equal liberty of conscience’.  But even in 1971 Rawls knew 
that the two phrases did not quite match which is why he preferred ‘equal liberty of conscience’.  
But after Employment Division v Smith162 in 1991, his ‘theory of justice’ had begun to feel like 
a farce and he tried to repair it.  That is why he wrote Political Liberalism and ‘The Idea of 
Public Reason Revisited’.163  They were makeshift repairs to A Theory of Justice, necessary 
because the US Supreme Court’s gradual abandonment of true ‘equal liberty of conscience’ 
had messed up the foundations of Rawls’ original philosophical work. ‘Public reason’ was the 
best idea he could find to explain what had happened.  Perhaps it could also provide western 
society with a tool to use to solve disagreements about ‘comprehensive doctrines’ in the future 
since commitment to the old solution, ‘equal liberty of conscience’, had dissolved. 
 
‘Public reason’ does explain contemporary American religious freedom jurisprudence. It may 
not be true to the historical vision variously expressed as ‘equal liberty of conscience’, ‘free 
exercise of religion’, ‘freedom of thought and conscience’, ‘freedom of religion and belief’.  
But public reason does explain why religious symbols are no longer acceptable in the US public 
square and why legislation that interfere with the free exercise of religion no longer need to 
pass a ‘strict scrutiny’ test to be constitutionally valid.  
 
An example of how Rawls’ idea of public reason explains the contemporary interface between 
liberty of conscience and ‘pure political reasoning’, may be seen in the US Federal District 
Court decision in Perry v Schwarzenegger.164  The case followed a long running political 
dispute between church groups defending traditional heterosexual marriage and gay rights 
activists who believed gay couples were entitled to ‘marriage status’ on equal rights grounds.  
The political argument had been running for more than a decade before the case came on for 
trial.    
 
In a March 2000 voting initiative (popularly known as Proposition 22), a 61/39 majority of 
California voters had authorised the enactment of a new section 308.5 in the California Family 
Law Code which stated that ‘[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is recognized in 
California’.  That statutory amendment was held invalid under the California State Constitution 
by a 4-3 majority of the California Supreme Court on May 15, 2008.165  But that result in its 
turn was overturned by a constitutional ballot proposition (Proposition 8) which amended the 
California State Constitution with the same words – ‘[o]nly marriage between a man and a 
woman is recognized in California’.  That proposition had passed by a 52.2/47.8 majority after 
an extensive campaign supported by the Catholic and LDS Churches which characterized the 
issue as one of religious liberty.   
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That matter came before the US Federal District Court as Perry v Schwarzenegger.  Chief 
Justice Vaughan Walker ruled that Proposition 8 was invalid because it violated the Due 
Process and Equal Protections clauses of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution 
since there was no valid secular justification for this law.  He wrote: 
 
The court defers to legislative (or in this case, popular) judgment if there is at least a debatable question 
whether the underlying basis for the classification is rational … Most laws subject to rational basis easily 
survive equal protection review because a legitimate reason can nearly always be found for treating 
different groups in an unequal manner … [But] excluding same-sex couples from marriage is simply not 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest … In the absence of a rational basis, what remains of 
proponents’ case is an inference, amply supported by evidence in the record, that Proposition 8 was 
premised on the belief that same-sex couples are simply not as good as opposite-sex couples … Whether 
that belief is based on moral disapproval of homosexuality, animus towards gays and lesbians or simply 
a belief that a relationship between a man and a woman is inherently better than a relationship between 
two men or two women, this belief is not a proper basis to legislate.166 
 
Justice Walker’s decision was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but a further 
appeal to the United States Supreme Court under the name Hollingsworth v Perry167 was 
declined 5-4 on the basis that the appellants did not have standing to bring suit because they 
could not demonstrate a real and tangible harm.168  The Supreme Court’s standing decision in 
the final appeal has technical credibility, but the underlying message in the US is that even a 
majority of voters cannot vote their consciences in an election any more if religion presents as 
the only rational explanation for their choice. If Justice Robert H Jackson were to continue his 
1943 astronomical metaphor in the present, he might say simply that ‘the stars have changed’. 
 
So what now for the concept of freedom of conscience, belief and religion under international 
human rights instruments and particularly the UDHR and the ICCPR?  Is the US Supreme 
Court correct? Is Rawls’ idea of public reason, the way of the future?  Has equal liberty of 
conscience passed its use by date?  
 
D     Public Reason Beyond the US? 
 
At the heart of the reasoning of Judge Walker in Perry v Schwarzenegger is an acceptance of 
the idea that public officials including judges can or should deduce and then judge the intent 
of citizens and groups of citizens when they participate in the public square.  US religious 
liberty scholars Kent Greenawalt and Michael Perry have expressed similar views.  Kent 
Greenawalt has said that a court would be justified in striking down a law for which the 
‘ascertainable dominant reason … was a view that acts are immoral, based on a religious point 
of view detached from any perspective about harm in this life’.169  Michael Perry has said that 
courts are justified in banning laws ‘for which the only discernible rationale is an offending 
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religious rationale’.170  Judge Walker drew ‘inference[s], amply supported by evidence171 and 
‘uncloaked the most likely reason for [the] passage’172 of Proposition 8 before he decided it 
was fair and just to strike it down.  
 
It may be that this reviewable intent logic is and will remain a uniquely American phenomenon.  
In countries like Australia where the doctrine of judicial review is more limited, it is difficult 
to imagine that a single judge would strike down any law on moral grounds.  That is because 
Australian laws are protected by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty from judicial 
invalidation unless they offend constitutional power.  Referenda results are theoretically more 
difficult to unsettle because they are the ultimate primary evidence of popular intent.  
 
Is it possible that the occasional influence of US constitutional ideology173 in Australia might 
lead to the invalidation of Australian laws on moral grounds since human rights and freedoms 
can conflict with the anti-discrimination norms that have been legislated into domestic law in 
accordance with Australia’s international treaty obligations?174  It is submitted that Australia’s 
steadfast refusal to implement any form of Bill of Rights,175 her well established pluralism and 
her track record of egalitarian thinking, do not readily comport with the idea that a majority 
religious group would be able to dictate to a minority of any kind because a theoretical religious 
majority believe that minority to be of less worth.  
 
Is it conceivable that Australian courts might be required in the future, to find the reason behind 
laws requiring differential treatment? Is it likely that Australian or other courts deeply 
committed to the Westminster tradition including parliamentary sovereignty might try and 
identify the intentions of those who framed particular laws so as to then be justified in striking 
them down if they did not comport with Rawlsian Public Reason?  And how would such an 
attempt to identify parliamentary intent square with the idea of freedom of religious intent and 
conscience? 
 
While the High Court of Australia has often said that it does not respect the intention of the 
legislature when it measures Commonwealth statutes against their constitutional enabling 
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power,176 in accordance with a tradition that stretches at least to Heydon’s case in 1584177 and 
reinforced in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), ‘the purpose of a statute is an essential 
guide to its construction’.178  But while an Australian court may use legislative intent as a guide 
in the construction of a statute enacted by a sovereign parliament, since Australia has 
steadfastly set its face against the enactment of any form of Bill of Rights179 which might enable 
judicial review of legislation against human rights norms, it is unlikely that any statute enacted 
for comprehensive doctrinal reasons would be struck down on those grounds.  
 
Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh have shown that ‘religious freedom is consistent with [religious] 
establishment’ and certainly with ‘establishment in its modern, diluted, symbolic form’.180  
They agree with the author that the idea that establishment is inconsistent with religious 
freedom is primarily an ‘American understanding’.181  They observe that ‘any argument that 
establishment is discriminatory rests primarily on the symbolic effect of the link with state 
institutions’;182 ‘that there is no reason to take the … words of US First Amendment, nor the 
way the [US] courts have interpreted them, as embodying either necessary or universal truths 
about the nature of establishment’,183 and they are certain that ‘[t]he ICCPR … does not … 
prohibit a state religion that acts noncoercively’.184  
 
They further state that ‘the [UN] Human Rights Committee has acknowledged that 
[establishment] arrangements that do not restrict religious liberty are possible’185 and that  ‘mild 
forms of state preference for one religion over another do not violate the [European] 
Convention [on Human Rights]’.186  They have also found that an establishment of religion 
does not inherently alienate those who do not belong to the established church,187 or that an 
establishment of religion almost always leads to inequality between religions.188  But they are 
at their most emphatic when they state that the claim that a liberal state must be neutral if 
religious freedom is to be respected, is a mirage.189  That is because there is always some 
established orthodoxy in a liberal state190 and the idea of neutrality is dangerous because it 
masks that reality.  They quote Robert George for the proposition that ‘secularism is itself … 
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[a] competing worldview … [or] sectarian doctrine’191 and affirm that ‘believers may feel 
equally alienated by a secular, political regime that extirpates religious symbolism and practice 
from the public square’.192 
 
Ahdar and Leigh conclude that ‘US First Amendment caselaw and doctrine’193 have distorted 
a correct or proper understanding of religious freedom.  ‘[O]ther countries, … international 
law, and … the ECHR cases demonstrate … that establishment’194 does not necessarily limit 
religious liberty and the disestablishment of religion is no sure guarantee that religious liberty 
has been maximized through neutrality.  
 
The bottom line is then that religious establishment is not a devil to be exorcised from every 
liberal state. 
 
IV     CONCLUSION 
 
US establishment clause jurisprudence has been through a number of changes.  While there is 
debate about whether the clause was originally intended to protect the state religious 
establishments which existed at the time of federation or to erect an impregnable wall between 
religion generally and the state, the establishment clause has come to mean that government 
cannot do anything which would endorse any religious idea or suggest that a non-religious-
believer was an outsider.  That idea of religious freedom is inconsistent with the nature of 
religious freedom expressed in international human rights instruments including the UDHR, 
the ICCPR and the European Convention on Human Rights, all of which proceed from the 
premise that an establishment of religion is not inconsistent with religious freedom. 
 
John Rawls’ idea of public reason presents as a generally applicable insight into the nature of 
liberal democracy, but when its evolution is tracked against the First Amendment jurisprudence 
of the US Supreme Court, it becomes apparent that Rawls developed his idea of public reason 
to explain US Supreme Court First Amendment orthodoxy post 1991.  Originally, John Rawls 
was committed to a vision of equal liberty of conscience which was constitutionally fixed in 
terms consistent with international freedom of religion norms.  As the US Supreme Court 
moved away from their civil rights era strict scrutiny protection of human rights, Rawls adapted 
his ideal vision of justice to explain what the US Supreme Court said worked best in liberal 
democratic practice.  
 
Neither US Supreme Court establishment clause jurisprudence nor Rawlsian public reason 
ideally protects equal liberty of conscience.  That is a problem since the US holds itself out as 
the world’s instructor when it comes to the protection of human rights generally and religious 
freedom in particular.195  Legislators, administrators and law and religion scholars need to 
                                                     
191 Ibid 678 quoting Robert P George, ‘A Clash of Orthodoxies’ (August-September 1999) First Things 33, 34-
35. 
192 Ibid quoting Steven D Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious 
Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1995) 114.  
193 Ibid 680. 
194 Ibid. 
195 The US Commission on International Religious Freedom is an independent bi-partisan Commission which was 
established by the International Religious Freedom Act 1998.  It is charged with researching, identifying and 
reviewing the circumstances of violations of religious freedom in other countries and to make recommendations 
to the US Executive and Congress on what steps the US should take to protect the religious freedom of religious 
believers and particularly Christians around the world.  It is required to identify the most serious violations of 
religious freedom and ‘Countries of Particular Concern’ (CPC).  India has been placed on the CPC list and has 
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recognise the qualitative differences in religious freedom models that are on offer because they 
have a large impact on the long term economic strength of their economies196 and the quality 
of life of their religious minorities.  Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh have also demonstrated that when 
it comes to constitutional freedom of religion, the neutrality used to justify separation is a 
mirage.197  There is always an established orthodoxy which alienates someone. State 
transparency that recognizes its own agenda but strives for inclusion is more likely to accord 
with international religious freedom norms. 
 
The existence of established orthodoxies raises larger philosophical problems if public reason 
is to be the new gold standard for public discourse in modern liberal democracies. Public reason 
is anti-democratic to the extent that it suppresses freedom of conscience and speech.  To insist 
that all discourse in the public square be conducted in the language of public reason is to 
suppress the freedom of speech of anyone that could not speak that way.  Public reason thus 
stands to subvert the freedom of speech of the less educated and religious in a liberal democratic 
society.198  To the extent that public reason would dilute or remove anyone’s entitlement to 
speak in the marketplace, it is discriminatory and coercive.199  Public reason may assist some 
members of society to articulate their views, but it should not directly or indirectly deny that 
right to others for that would deny those members of our society their human dignity.200  
 
Finnis, Eisgruber and Sagar and Smith have demonstrated that public reason would banish all 
concern for the existence of objective truth from the public square since the suggestion that it 
exists amounts to the assertion of an inadmissible comprehensive doctrine.201  Steven D Smith 
has agreed202 and observed additionally that such theoretical banishment is ironical and futile; 
ironical since the US framers were obsessed about and committed to objective truth when they 
debated the US Constitution,203 and futile because it is almost impossible to detect a ‘truth 
concern’ in a human being,204 though Judge Vaughan Walker apparently succeeded in the 
Schwartzenegger case.205 
 
In concluding, I submit that John Rawls’ ‘idea of public reason’ was fashioned and developed 
in the context of the US Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  I have 
suggested that the evolution of his thought closely tracks that jurisprudence and shows no 
significant influence from other analyses of religious freedom.  Though he responded to Hart 
and Habermas in his later work, he was responding not to their concern about his dilution of 
religious liberty, but to his general account of basic liberties and to the different rhetorical 
devices that they had used.206  I submit that Rawls’ ideology is subversive of freedom of 
conscience and speech as established in international human rights instruments and as accepted 
                                                     
responded to that US categorisation with disappointment <http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-
releases/uscirf-places-india-watch-list>.  
196 There is a growing literature which demonstrates that religious freedom is good for a nation’s economy.  See 
for eg, Brian J Grim, ‘Religious Freedom: Good for What Ails Us?’ (2008) 6(2) The Review of Faith & 
International Affairs 3; Brian J Grim, ‘The Modern Chinese Secret to Sustainable Economic Growth’ (2015) 13(2) 
The Review of Faith & International Affairs 1. 
197 Ahdar and Leigh, above n1, 677-80. 
198 See above nn 134 and 135 and supporting text. 
199 See above nn 113 – 143 and supporting text. 
200 See above nn 144 and 145. 
201 See above nn 122 and 148 and supporting text. 
202 See above nn 123-133 and supporting text. 
203 Ibid. 
204 See above nn 145-147 and supporting text. 
205 See above nn 168-172 and supporting text. 
206 See above n 163. 
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outside the US.  I further submit that the understanding of freedoms of conscience and speech 
that western society has achieved following centuries of bloodshed are worth retaining and 
protecting.  This article was written to draw out what appear to be inconsistencies between 
these essential human freedoms and Rawls’ public reason ideology.  Freedom of conscience 
and speech provide a safer standard for human discourse in the public square than public 
reason.  That is because the overlapping consensus we achieve when we consider all the 
competing views and their supporting ideologies is a much more durable and worthwhile 
consensus than the pretended consensus which results following the suppression of the views 
of large sections of our communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
